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This paper analyzes the optimal procurement, processing, and production decisions of a meat-processingcompany (hereafter, a “packer”) in a beef supply chain. The packer processes fed cattle to produce two beef
products, program (premium) boxed beef and commodity boxed beef, in fixed proportions, but with downward
substitution of the premium product for the commodity product. The packer can source input (fed cattle) from
a contract market, where long-term contracts are signed in advance of the required delivery time, and from a
spot market on the spot day. Contract prices are taken to be of a general window form, linear in the spot price
but capped by upper and lower limits on realized contract price. Our analysis provides managerial insights on
the interaction of window contract terms with processing options. We show that the packer benefits from a low
correlation between the spot price and product market uncertainties, and this is independent of the form of the
window contract. Although the expected revenues from processing increase in spot price variability, the overall
impact on profitability depends on the parameters of the window contract. Using a calibration based on the
report by the GIPSA (Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration. 2007. GIPSA livestock and meat
marketing study, vol. 3: Fed cattle and beef industries. Report, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington,
DC), this paper elucidates for the first time the value of long-term contracting as a complement to spot sourcing
in the beef supply chain. Our comparative statics results provide some rules of thumb for the packer for the
strategic management of the procurement portfolio. In particular, we show that higher variability (higher spot
price variability, product market variability, and correlation) increases the profits of the packer, but decreases
the reliance on the contract market relative to the spot market.
Key words : contracting; beef supply chain; commodity risk management; multiproduct newsvendor;
window contracts
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoret-
ical basis for understanding the trade-offs facing a
meat-processing company (hereafter, a “packer”) in
the choice of alternative arrangements for sourcing
fed cattle, when that packer acts as a wholesaler into
several final product markets. This is an example of
a broader class of risk management and contracting
problems, including petroleum and many agricultural
products, in which a single primary input gives rise
to multiple outputs. The resulting interdependencies
between procurement practices for the primary input
and downstream markets present new challenges for
supply chain management.
We examine these challenges in the context of the
U.S. beef industry, which is the largest single industry
within U.S. agriculture, generating between $34 and
$37 billion per year in 2006–2008 and accounting for
20% of the annual total market value of agricultural
products sold in the United States (U.S. Department
of Agriculture 2009). A similar analysis would apply
to other cattle-producing regions of the world that
rely for fed-cattle procurement on a mix of spot mar-
kets and long-term contracts (e.g., Europe and South
America). Although this paper will focus on the beef
supply chain for specificity, much of our analysis
would also apply to other live-animal supply chains
such as pork hog, broiler chicken and lamb, and to
other supply chains that have a common input from
which multiple outputs are produced.
The beef industry is a combination of assembly
and disassembly and of product flow smoothing.
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The base production unit in the industry—the beef
cow herd—lives outdoors and consumes grass-based
forage. After obtaining cheap growth of the animal
frame, the animals are referred to as “feeder cattle”
and are assembled by the cattle-feeding industry.
Feeder animals feed for four to six months depend-
ing on seasonal factors, such as energy requirements
due to living outdoors and seasonal demand for beef
consumption, and grain prices relative to beef prices.
Finished animals are referred to as “fed cattle” and
are marketed to packers.
As reported in the GIPSA (2007) report, there are
some 25 large commercial fed-cattle slaughtering and
processing facilities in the United States. And it is
here that disassembly begins. Each animal can be
used to produce a subset of hundreds of standard
beef cuts. These are packaged as premium products
(program boxed beef) or commodity products (com-
modity boxed beef). Food service firms such as restau-
rant chains may procure program beef. Grocery stores
market a variety of commodity beef. There are distinct
differences in regional and seasonal demand patterns
across the United States for different beef products.
Several interlinked markets operate to determine
pricing and delivery quantities at various stages along
the beef supply chain. We will focus on the two mar-
kets of greatest interest to packers (see Figure 1):
1. the market between processors/packers and all
upstream elements (including feedlots and prior ele-
ments) of the beef value chain;
2. the market between processors/packers and all
downstream elements (including wholesalers and
retailers) of the beef value chain.
Considering the upstream elements in the beef sup-
ply chain, there are actually two markets of interest:
the spot market and the contract market.
Spot markets (also referred to as cash markets) are
real-time regional markets for transactions of fed cat-
tle, often through auctions. In keeping with the exten-
sive literature on the subject, e.g., GIPSA (2007), we
Figure 1 Upstream and Downstream Elements for Packers in Beef Supply Chain
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will assume throughout that spot markets are com-
petitive, i.e., the price is not sensitive to the actions of
any of the agents (buyers or sellers) who participate
in this market.
Contract markets feature longer-term arrangements
between feedlot owners and packers. The contracts
themselves are often referred to as “marketing agree-
ments.” Such agreements may allow some flexibility
in the quantity delivered, in the usual options form, or
have more advanced features in pricing of yield risks
(grid or formula based) than fixed forwards based on
live-weight metrics. We analyze here a general class of
“window” contracts, with contract price equal to a lin-
ear function of the spot price when the resulting con-
tract price is in a window between fixed upper and
lower limits, and otherwise capped by the indicated
limits. As also discussed by Li and Kouvelis (1999),
window contracts provide a risk-sharing mechanism
between the buyer and the seller for spot price risk
exposure. This general contract form includes firm
fixed forwards as a special case (when the upper and
lower limits coincide) as well as the “standard con-
tract,” most common in the industry, which has no
upper or lower limits on contract price. The standard
contract specifies the price per unit on the basis of the
spot price prevailing at a specified market on deliv-
ery day, plus a fixed surcharge. The fixed surcharge is
intended to cover the cost of additional feeding spec-
ifications that are part of the contract and that give
rise to the additional value of contract cattle resulting
from the higher percentage of premium product (pro-
gram beef) in these cattle. Contract cattle can also be
resold in the spot market by the contracting packer if
they are not needed for production.
For packers in the United States, the spot market is
a very important source of physical supply, averag-
ing for many packers in excess of 60% of total supply
according to the GIPSA (2007). The heavy reliance on
the spot market noted in the GIPSA (2007) report is
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driven in part by the large number of small produc-
ers of cattle, who raise cattle as complements to their
other farming activities, and the fact that spot sales
in organized markets are an efficient way of bring-
ing such cattle to market. Contract purchases obtained
from larger feedlots offer certain advantages to pack-
ers such as the ability to contract for and monitor spe-
cial feeding regimes that are intended to increase the
quality of meat produced.
Focusing on a single packer, we consider the opti-
mal mix of contract and spot purchases in provid-
ing input from upstream feedlots and spot markets.
Our analysis shows the impact on this portfolio of
spot price and demand uncertainty and correlation
and the degree of substitution between products in
final markets. We assume that neither the cattle nor
the finished products can be inventoried—they have a
certain “ripe” or sale date toward which all contract-
ing is directed.1 Because the focus is on the short and
medium term, capacity and processing technology are
also assumed fixed.
This paper intends to make contributions in two
areas: (1) in the analysis of general window contracts
common in agricultural and metals supply chains,
and (2) in the analysis of a benchmark case for the
most important U.S. agricultural market, beef. We
undertake both of these analyses for fixed proportion
technologies, which entail the production of multiple
outputs from a single primary input, with downward
product substitution possibilities, which entail the
conversion of premium output to standard output.
Our analysis of window contracts on the primary
input focuses on the interactions of the contract terms
with processing options, including product substitu-
tion, and the associated revenues of processed prod-
uct. We demonstrate (with normally distributed spot
price and symmetric window around the forward
price) that the value of using a window contract
instead of a fixed forward contract and its implica-
tions on the optimal procurement portfolio are deter-
mined by the ordering between the forward price and
the mean contract procurement price. Our compara-
tive statics results provide managerial insights on the
interaction of contract terms with processing options.
We show that the firm benefits from a lower cor-
relation between the spot price and product market
uncertainties. We also show that the expected rev-
enues from processing increase in spot price variabil-
ity, but the overall impact on profitability depends
on the parameters of the window contract. In the
1 Following the GIPSA (2007) report, herds are treated as inventory
or investment goods but fed cattle must be marketed within a two-
to three-week window or face substantial feeding cost penalties and
meat quality penalties. Likewise, fresh beef is sold under the old
adage: “sell it or smell it.”
absence of spot procurement, the firm should increase
its contract volume with a lower correlation, whereas
the same holds with a higher spot price variability if
the window contract does not have a lower upside
protection than the downside opportunity loss. With
spot procurement, the impact of the correlation and
the spot price variability on the optimal procurement
portfolio is more subtle and is determined by the
interplay between the spot price and product market
uncertainties.
Our contributions on the beef industry focus on the
central player in these markets, the packer. Special-
izing our generalized contract form to the standard
contract in use in the industry, we illustrate the signif-
icant impact on profits of integrated risk management
in this fixed proportions supply chain. In particular,
using a calibration based on the GIPSA (2007) report,
this paper elucidates for the first time the value of
long-term contracting in the beef supply chain. This
has been a point of continuing controversy in the pol-
icy debate concerning the structure and operations of
the beef industry. Our analysis provides some rules
of thumb for the packer. We demonstrate that higher
variability (higher spot price variability, product mar-
ket variability, and correlation) increases the profits,
but decreases the value of the contract market relative
to the spot market. We also show that higher demand
substitution is detrimental to the packer’s profitabil-
ity and reduces dependence on contract procurement,
but product substitution does not have any significant
effect on the packer’s decisions and performance.
This paper proceeds as follows. We review rele-
vant literature in the next section. Thereafter follows
our model development in §3 and its optimal solu-
tion in §4. This model development provides a gen-
eral solution for window contracts based on payoffs
that are linear in an underlying spot market, with
comparative statics for this general model provided in
§5. Section 6 provides numerical simulations for the
GIPSA (2007) data and for the standard contract form
used in U.S. beef markets, a special case of our general
window contracts. These results also provide compar-
ative statics of model results for product market and
spot market parameters of interest. We conclude in §7
with a discussion of limitations of our analysis and
the path forward for future research.
2. Literature Review
The focus of this paper is on supply chain contracting
in the presence of spot markets. See Cachon (2003)
and Kleindorfer and Wu (2003) for a review of the lit-
erature related to this theme. Assuming a competitive
spot market (i.e., based on large numbers of interact-
ing buyers and sellers), Wu and Kleindorfer (2005)
provide conditions such that it is optimal for buy-
ers to source from both the contract market and the
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spot market. Mendelson and Tunca (2007) provide an
alternative rationale for the existence of simultaneous
forward and spot market sourcing, based on strate-
gic spot trading. A similar closed spot market model
was used by Chod et al. (2010a). We do not consider
such strategic spot market interactions in this paper
because (as noted in the GIPSA 2007 report) spot mar-
kets for fed cattle, our target application, have large
numbers of informed participants, transparent in their
function and competitive in their operation.
Two streams of literature are evidently related to
the multiple-output character of the beef problem.
The first stream of papers analyzes coproduction sys-
tems where multiple outputs are produced simultane-
ously in a single production run (Gerchak et al. 1996,
Bitran and Gilbert 1994, Hsu and Bassok 1999, Tomlin
and Wang 2008). The standard coproduction problem
foresees different grades or quality levels of output,
where yields for these different grades are typically
random. The problem of contracting for inputs (e.g.,
wafer starts in semiconductor manufacture) when fac-
ing demand schedules for each of the grades has some
similarities to the beef-processing problem, including
downward substitution in production. However, the
primary focus in the coproduction literature is on the
production quantity and the allocation of the realized
production output to the product demands, whereas
the primary focus in a proportional output setting
such as beef markets is on integration of upstream
and downstream pricing and contracting.
A second stream of papers related to the multiple-
output character of the beef problem is the liter-
ature on newsvendor network models. As defined
by Van Mieghem and Rudi (2002), newsvendor net-
works encompass the structural properties of the
single-product newsvendor problem and extend this
to the multiproduct setting (with non-price-sensitive
stochastic demand). We refer the reader to Dong et al.
(2010a) for a review of papers using a newsvendor
network formulation and for further applications in
the context of multiple markets and transshipment
networks. The beef supply chain context requires
a generalization of the newsvendor network model
to include pricing and proportional input–output
relationships, with substitution possibilities both in
production and in demand. These are essential gen-
eralizations for beef supply chains and many others
(e.g., petroleum and many agricultural products) that
involve input–output interdependencies that tran-
scend the supply network configuration and involve
the product structure itself.
The literature on supply chain management issues
in the agricultural sector has focused mainly on
uncertain yields and contracting issues related to mul-
tiactor supply chains. In this regard, Kazaz (2004) ana-
lyzes the choice between long-term contracts and a
secondary supply option with yield uncertainty with
a special focus on the olive industry. Burer et al. (2008)
look at supply chain coordination issues in the seed
industry, focusing on different contract types preva-
lently used in practice. Lowe and Preckel (2004) pro-
vide a summary of literature on crop production.
The GIPSA (2007) provides an extensive literature
review of the beef industry, which is updated and
supplemented by Boyabatlı et al. (2011). The essential
contribution of the present paper relative to this ear-
lier work is the explicit treatment and integration of
fixed proportion output markets with upstream mar-
ket characteristics and contracting decisions.
Against the background of the above literature,
we note several important lacunae. For the upstream
market, there is no research on the optimal mix of pro-
curement methods (contract versus spot) within the
beef industry. This is an important matter from a pol-
icy perspective, as the above discussion of the GIPSA
(2007) report and the controversy concerning contract
markets make clear. Furthermore, the key issue of
quality/yield risks (which differ across contract and
spot cattle) needs to be integrated with production
and demand management. For the downstream mar-
ket, the key issue is that of multiple products arising
from processing and the demand uncertainties and
substitution effects associated with these. It is on these
issues, and their related impacts on optimal process-
ing decisions for the packer, that we focus our model
and our results. We begin with a general treatment of
spot-based window contracts, which we then special-
ize to the beef supply chain.
3. Model Description
3.1. Notation and Preliminaries
A realization of the random variable y˜ is denoted
by y. Bold letters represent vectors of the required
size. Vectors are column vectors and the prime (′)
denotes the transpose operator. We have 4u5+ =
max4u105 and ì12 = ì1 ∪ì2. Pr denotes probability,
and Ɛ denotes the expectation operator. Monotonic
relations are used in the weak sense unless other-
wise stated. “C-input” denotes the input sourced from
the contract market, and “S-input” denotes the input
sourced from the spot market. The cumulative dis-
tribution function (cdf) and probability density func-
tion (pdf) of the standard normal random variable are
denoted by ê4 · 5 and 4 · 5, respectively.
We consider a firm (the packer in the beef setting)
that procures and processes a single primary input
(fed cattle) to produce two final products, a premium
(program beef) and a standard product (commodity
beef). We model the firm’s procurement, processing,
and production decisions in a two-period framework.
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3.2. Procurement
We consider two sources for procurement, contracts
and spot markets. A typical contract specifies the vol-
ume of C-input committed by the firm in advance of
the spot market and delivered to the firm on the spot
day. The firm can also buy S-input from the spot mar-
ket on the day. Let QC denote the volume of C-input,
and let QS4P S5 denote the volume of S-input at the
prevailing spot price P S . We assume that P˜ S has a con-
tinuous distribution with positive support with finite
expectation S and standard deviation S .
There are differences between C- and S-input in
terms of quality, processing cost, and contract price.
C-input is priced as a linear function of spot price,
capped by upper and lower limits on C-input price.2
Formally, the unit price of C-input on the day is
max6min4u1P S + 51 l7 with l ≤ u. Here l is the lower
bound, u is the upper bound on the contract price,
and  is a contract-specific per-unit adjustment (to
account for differences in quality, delivery terms, and
other matters that distinguish C-input from S-input).
We note that a pure forward contract is obtained as a
special case of the window contract when l= u.
The unit price of the S-input is the prevailing
spot price P S with an additive transaction cost t ≥ 0
applied. This transaction cost reflects transportation
cost from the spot market to the firm’s plant. The
firm can also resell C-input, which it receives in the
spot market at a unit sales price of 41 −5P S , where
0 ≤  ≤ 1 represents a discount or transaction cost.
We assume Ɛ6max6min4u1P S + 51 l77 > 41 −5S (i.e.,
expected contract price is higher than expected spot
resale revenue per unit), because otherwise C-input
would dominate S-input.
3.3. Processing
We define z′ = 4zC1 zS5 as the processed input vec-
tor composed of C-input, zC , and S-input, zS . We
assume a processing capacity constraint K (hereafter
referred to as plant size) such that 1′z ≤ K, and the
total processing cost is denoted by C4z5= c01′z+zS +
c14K − 1′z52. Here, c0 > 0 is the common processing
cost parameter,  ≥ 0 represents the additional pro-
cessing cost of S-input due to nonuniformity, and
2 This is in line with practice in the beef industry where C-input
is priced through formula pricing that ties the base price to the
spot price, with a specified surcharge for the higher premium con-
tent of C-input (e.g., MacDonald 2003), and in line with the pork-
hog industry where window contracts are common (e.g., Roe et al.
2004). As in the metals industry (e.g., Kleindorfer and Wu 2003,
Geman 2005), the reason for using the spot price as a benchmark
for contract prices is so that neither party to the trade then ends
up with windfall gains or losses relative to the observable bench-
mark of the spot market, with consequent incentives for regret and
reneging on the contract.
c1 ≥ 0 is a utilization cost parameter. As the total pro-
cessed input 41′z5 increases, the average variable cost
C4z5/1′z decreases.3
3.4. Production
For each unit of input, there are two possible outputs,
and the maximum proportions of these depend on the
sources of input. We denote aji as the fixed propor-
tion of the processed type j = 8C1S9 input for prod-
uct i = 81129. We assume a′1 = 4aC1 1 aS15 ≤ a′2 = 4aC2 1 aS25,
i.e., the maximum premium product available from
a unit of input is lower than the potential standard
product available, whatever the source of the input.
We also assume aj1 + aj2 = s ≤ 1 for j ∈ 8C1S9, i.e., the
total yield is identical for both input types, with yield
losses from processing 4s < 15. To capture quality dif-
ferences in the two input sources, we assume aC1 =
aS1 +4 and aC2 = aS2 −4 for 4 ≥ 0, where 4 denotes the
quality premium for C-input, i.e., C-input provides a
higher proportion of premium product than S-input.
The firm-specific demand for final outputs is
stochastic, price dependent, and represented by
the linear inverse-demand functions p14x1 ˜15 = ˜1 +
4P˜ S − S5 − b1x11 − e4x22 + x125 and p24x1 ˜25 = ˜2 +
4P˜ S −S5−b24x22 +x125− ex11. Here, x′ = 4x111x221x125
is the production vector, e represents the cross-price
elasticity parameter, and bi and pi denote own-price
slope of the inverse demand function and price for
product i, respectively. The choke price for prod-
uct i is ˜i + 4P˜ S − S5, where  determines the cor-
relation between the spot price and output prices.
A positive (negative)  implies a positive (negative)
correlation. The parameter Î˜′ = 4˜11 ˜25 is a bivariate
random variable with continuous distribution that has
bounded expectation 41125 with covariance matrix
è, where èii = 2i and èij = ij for i 6= j , and 
denotes the correlation coefficient. We assume that the
distributions of P˜ S and Î˜ are statistically independent.4
For analytical convenience, we assume < 41 −5/s.5
3 Fixed costs are also important elements of the cost structure of
processors. They represent payments to capital providers and indi-
rect facility costs. We neglect these in the model development
because they do not affect the optimal solution. Fixed costs are
reflected in the calibration underlying our numerical results in §6.
Decreasing short-term average costs throughout the entire range of
feasible input levels are well documented and important for pack-
ers in the beef industry (Koontz and Lawrence 2010).
4 If we let Y˜i = ˜i +4P˜ S −S5 denote the choke price for product
i, then our assumptions here imply a multivariate distribution on
4Y11Y21PS5 with Yi = i , Yi =
√
 2i +2 2S , Corr4Yi1P S5 = ëi =
4S/Yi 5, and Corr4Y11Y25=ë1ë2 +
√
1 −ë 21
√
1 −ë 22 , where Corr
denotes the correlation coefficient.
5 This limits the amount of positive correlation between the choke
price and spot price we can capture in the model below, but for
many applications this is not a tight constraint. For example, for
the GIPSA data examined in §6 below, where = 0004 and s = 006,
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In the production vector x, xkl denotes the quantity
of product l produced from the capacity 4a′kz = aCk zC +
aSkz
S5 dedicated to product k. Because the first product
is premium product, we assume that b1 ≥ b2 ≥ 0, i.e.,
the first product demand is less responsive to changes
in price than the second product. In particular, we
assume b2 ≤ b14aS1/aS25.6
We allow for two different substitution channels for
production. There exists downward product substitution:
the firm can produce standard product using the pre-
mium product yield, and not vice versa. We assume
that the firm uses a market-clearing pricing strategy;
i.e., available input is processed into one or other
of the two final products, and price is adjusted in
profit-maximizing fashion to sell all finished products.
There is also demand substitution through the cross-
price elasticity parameter e. We assume that outputs
are substitutes so that the price of each product is
decreasing in the price of the other product 4e ≥ 05,
and this cross-price effect is lower than the own-price
effect 4e≤ min4b11 b255. When b1 = b2 = e= 0, we have
the special case where the firm is a pure price taker.
3.5. The Firm’s Decision Problem
We model the firm’s decision problem as a two-
stage stochastic recourse problem. In Stage 0, the firm
decides on the volume of C-input 4QC5 to contract,
facing spot price and product market uncertainties.
At Stage 1, P S and Î are realized, and QC is deliv-
ered to the firm. The firm then decides on its spot
market purchases 4QS5, as well as on the volume of
input to process from C- and S-input (zC ≤ QC and
zS ≤ QS , respectively). This decision also implies the
firm’s spot market sales, namely, 4QC +QS − zC − zS5.
Finally, the firm decides on the production quanti-
ties of the two products that either come from their
own product yield 4x111x225, or through substitution
of the premium product yield to produce standard
product 4x125. The objective of the firm is to maximize
its expected total profit at Stage 0.
We now formulate the firm’s decision problem
starting from Stage 1:
max
QS1 z1x
{−QC6max4min4u1P S + 51 l57−QS4P S + t5
+ 41 −5P S6QC +QS − 1′z7
this constraint implies an upper bound of 106 on . For estimated
values of the variance of spot and product prices, this implies a
maximum correlation of 0075, well above that required to model
realistic correlations in the beef industry.
6 This is an appropriate assumption for beef markets, where price
sensitivity is considerably higher for premium products than for
standard products. However, all of the results related to the char-
acterization of the optimal solution hold for (i) a1 > a2, (ii) a1 ≤ a2
and b2 ≤ b14aS1/aS25, and (iii) a1 ≤ a2 and b2 ∈ 6b14aS1/aS251 b15 with an
additional restriction on the demand substitution parameter, e ∈
64b2a
S
2 − b1aS15/4aS2 − aS151 b25.
− 6c01′z + zS + c14K− 1′z527
+ x1141 +4P S −S5− b1x115
+ 4x22 + x12542 +4P S −S5− b24x22 + x1255
− 2e4x22 + x125x11
}
(1)
s.t. zC ≤QC1 zS ≤QS1 1′z ≤K1
x11 + x12 = a′1z1 x22 = a′2z1
QS ≥ 01 z ≥ 01 x ≥ 00
In (1), the first two terms represent the total pro-
curement cost of the firm. The third term is the rev-
enue from spot market sales, and the fourth term
is the firm’s total processing cost. The final terms in
the objective function denote the sales revenue from
the product markets. The first two constraints ensure
that the firm does not process more than the avail-
able input of each type. The third constraint is the
firm’s plant size constraint. The fourth and the fifth
constraints represent the available yield for each out-
put under market-clearing pricing.7 Let ç4QC3P S1Î5
denote the optimal Stage 1 profit for a given QC .
Anticipating these decisions, at Stage 0, the firm
solves for the optimal C-input to contract, QC∗, to
maximize its expected profit: V ∗ = maxQC≥0 V 4QC5 =
Ɛ6ç4QC3PS1Î57, where the expectation is taken over
P˜ S and Î˜.
4. The Optimal Strategy
In this section, we describe the optimal solution for
the firm’s procurement, processing, and production
decisions. We solve the problem by backward induc-
tion starting from Stage 1. All the proofs are rele-
gated to the online technical appendix (available at
http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/1801/).
4.1. Stage 1: Spot Market
To find the optimal solution for (1), we first solve
for the firm’s optimal output of products 1 and 2,
x′ = 4x111x221x125, given the vector of processed inputs
z′ = 4zC1 zS5:
max
x
{
x1141 +4P S−S5−b1x115+4x22 +x125
·42 +4P S−S5−b24x22 +x1255−2e4x22 +x125x11
}
s.t. x11 +x12 =a′1z1 x22 =a′2z1 x≥00 (2)
7 It is theoretically possible that a profit-maximizing firm could
engage in pure waste to attempt to affect the price of its products so
that a more general model would allow these processing capacity
constraints to hold as inequalities. However, this theoretical pos-
sibility is not of interest when final product markets are highly
competitive, as they are in beef for example, where the firm-specific
price elasticity of demand is very high. Thus, to avoid uninteresting
complications, we treat these constraints as equalities.
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The key decision here is the optimal product substi-
tution level, i.e., the allocation between the two final
products of the available premium product yield a′1z.
Proposition 1. The unique optimal production vector
x∗4z1Î1PS5′ = 4x∗111x∗221x∗125 for a given processed input
vector z′ = 4zC1 zS5 is given by
x∗4z1Î1PS5′
=

4a′1z1a
′
2z105 if Î∈â 11(
4b2 −e5
b1 +b2 −2e
s1′z+ 1 −2
24b1 +b2 −2e5
1a′2z1
4b1 −e5
b1 +b2 −2e
a′1z−
4b2 −e5
b1 +b2 −2e
a′2z−
˜1 − ˜2
24b1 +b2 −2e5
)
if Î∈â 21
401a′2z1a
′
1z5 if Î∈â 31
where
â 1
0= 8Î2 Î≥ 01 2 ≤ 1 − 264b1 − e5a′1z − 4b2 − e5a′2z791
â 2
0= 8Î2 Î≥ 01 2 > 1 − 264b1 − e5a′1z − 4b2 − e5a′2z71
2 < 1 + 24b2 − e5s1′z91
â 3
0= 8Î2 Î≥ 01 2 ≥ 1 + 24b2 − e5s1′z90
The optimal sales revenue in the product markets,
Ï∗4z1Î1PS5, is characterized by
14a′1z1a
′
2z1Î1P
S5
0= 1a′1z − b14a′1z52 + 2a′2z − b24a′2z52
− 2e4a′1z54a′2z5+4P S −S5s1′z if Î ∈ â 11
24a′1z1a
′
2z1Î1P
S5
0= 41 − 25
2
44b1 + b2 − 2e5
+ 14b2 − e5+ 24b1 − e5
b1 + b2 − 2e
s1′z
− 4b1b2 − e
25
b1 + b2 − 2e
4s1′z52 +4P S −S5s1′z if Î ∈ â 21
34a′1z1a
′
2z1Î1P
S5
0= 2s1′z − b24s1′z52 +4P S −S5s1′z if Î ∈ â 30
When 1 is sufficiently greater than 2, the first
market is highly profitable compared to the second
market, and the firm optimally allocates all the avail-
able premium product yield a′1z to the first product
4Î ∈ â 15. We denote this as the no product substitution
regime. Similarly, when 2 is sufficiently greater than
1, the second market is highly profitable compared
to the first market, and the firm optimally allocates all
the available premium product yield a′1z to the second
product 4Î ∈ â 35. We denote this as the full product sub-
stitution regime. If the difference between 1 and 2 is
moderate, then the firm optimally allocates some part
of a′1z to both products 4Î ∈ â 25. We denote this as the
partial product substitution regime. The allocation to the
standard product decreases as 41 − 25 increases.
For notational convenience, we define k4a′1z1a
′
2z1
Î1P S5 as the optimal sales revenue under a type k
product substitution regime (or Î ∈ â k) for k ∈ 8112139
for given product i yields a′iz1 i ∈ 81129. Here, 1 repre-
sents no substitution, 2 represents partial substitution,
and 3 represents full substitution.
The firm cannot generate revenue by selling S-input
back to the spot market (because there are transaction
costs in both spot procurement 4t5 and spot sales 45).
Thus, QS∗ = zS∗: Any input the firm procures from the
spot market is processed. Because the optimal pro-
duction vector is uniquely defined by z, we can opti-
mize the Stage 1 problem over the processing vector
z′ = 4zC1 zS5. We now state an important property of
the optimal solution that will enable us to simplify
further the decision problem in (1).
Proposition 2. 4QC − zC∗5× zS∗ = 0.
The firm only processes S-input after all available
C-input has been used. This is because C-input is
preferred over S-input because it has a lower pro-
curement cost 4 ≥ 01 t ≥ 05, a lower processing cost
4≥ 05, and a higher proportion of the premium prod-
uct 4ã≥ 05 that is valuable under the no product sub-
stitution regime as follows from Proposition 1.
Using Proposition 2, we can redefine the Stage 1
decision problem in (1) as a single-variable optimiza-
tion problem. We relegate the detailed characteriza-
tion of this equivalent formulation to §A of the online
technical appendix. We only provide the highlights
of this formulation. Let z denote the total process-
ing amount, and let å4z5 denote the Stage 1 objective
function. In the optimal solution, we have zC∗ =
min4z∗1QC5 and zS∗ = 4z∗ −QC5+.
To obtain the equivalent formulation, we first
define
åk1C4z5 = −QC6max4min4u1P S+51u57
+41−5P S6QC −z7−c0z−c14K−z52
+k4aC1 z1aC2 z1Î1P S51
åk1S4z5 = −QC6max4min4u1P S+51u57
−4z−QC54P S+t5−c0z−4z−QC5−c14K−z52
+k44aC1 −aS15QC +aS1z14aC2 −aS25QC +aS2z1Î1P S51
for k ∈ 8112139, where åk1C represents the objective
function when the firm only uses C-input for process-
ing, and the optimal production belongs to a type k
product substitution regime. Notice that the argument
of k is given by aCi z because we are only process-
ing C-input. Similarly, åk1S denotes the objective func-
tion when the firm processes S-input, and the optimal
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product substitution regime is of type k. The argu-
ment of k is given by 4aCi − aSi 5QC + aSi z because the
first QC units of z are C-inputs. The Stage 1 objective
function å4z5 is a combination of åk1j for k ∈ 8112139
and j ∈ 8C1S9, and å4z5 is strictly concave in z (see
the online technical appendix).
There exists a six-region partitioning of 411 25
space such that the formulation of the Stage 1 prob-
lem takes a unique form in each of these regions.
These regions correspond to each of the three prod-
uct substitution regimes and which of the processed
inputs, C-input or S-input, is used under these substi-
tution regimes. The six regions are defined as follows.
ì12 no substitution for C- and S-input;
ì22 no substitution for C-input, no and partial sub-
stitution for S-input;
ì32 no and partial substitution for C-input, partial
substitution for S-input;
ì42 full and partial substitution for C-input, partial
substitution for S-input;
ì52 full substitution for C-input, full and partial
substitution for S-input;
ì62 full substitution for C- and S-input where
ì1
0= {Î2 Î≥012 ≤1 −264b1 −e5aC1 −4b2 −e5aC2 7K0
+264b1 −e54aC1 −aS15−4b2 −e54aC2 −aS2574K−QC5+
}
1
ì2
0= {Î2 Î≥012 ≤1 −264b1 −e5aC1
−4b2 −e5aC2 7min4QC1K512>1 −264b1 −e5aC1
−4b2 −e5aC2 7K+264b1 −e54aC1 −aS15
−4b2 −e54aC2 −aS2574K−QC5+
}
1
ì3
0= {Î2 Î≥012>1 −264b1 −e5aC1
−4b2 −e5aC2 7min4QC1K512 ≤1
}
1
ì4
0= 8Î2 Î≥012>112 ≤1 +24b2 −e5smin4QC1K591
ì5
0= {Î2 Î≥012>1 +24b2 −e5smin4QC1K51
2 ≤1 +24b2 −e5sK
}
1
ì6
0= {Î2 Î≥012>1 +24b2 −e5sK}0
The above structure is intuitive: As the difference
between premium and standard product market prof-
itability decreases, i.e., 1 − 2 decreases, the firm
moves from no substitution for either input type
(in ì1) to various degrees of partial substitution (in
ì21345) to full substitution for either input type (in ì6)
in the product markets.
To provide further intuition, consider the special
case in which the firm is a pure price taker 4b1 =
b2 = e = 05. In this case, the above six regions col-
lapse into two (ì1 and ì6): the firm uses no prod-
uct substitution for either input type when Î ∈ ì1 =
8Î2 Î≥ 01 2 ≤ 19 and full product substitution when
Î ∈ì6 = 8Î2 Î≥ 01 2 > 19.
The optimal processing decision z∗ for each of the
ì4 · 5 regions is technical, but straightforward given the
quadratic objective function and linear constraints. In
each of these regions, the optimal processing decision
z∗ is unique and is characterized by a number of spot
price thresholds. In particular, eight spot price thresh-
olds (denoted by P¯ 4 · 5) characterize z∗ for Î ∈ì123, and
another eight spot price thresholds (denoted by P 4 · 5)
characterize z∗ for Î ∈ ì456. As shown in §B of the
online technical appendix, the two sets of eight spot
price thresholds each have a fixed order, but they
appear in different combinations for the optimal solu-
tion for each of the ì4 · 5 regions.
As an example, consider Î ∈ì1, where the firm uses
no substitution regime for either input. In this region,
z∗ is characterized by
z∗ =

0 if P S ≥ P¯ 01
z∗11C =
41−−s54P¯ 0 −P S5
26b14aC1 52 +b24aC2 52 +2eaC1 aC2 +c17
if P¯ 0>P S ≥ P¯ 14min4QC1K551
min4QC1K5
if P¯ 14min4QC1K55>P S ≥ P¯ 44min4QC1K551
z∗11S =min4QC1K5+
4P¯ 4 −P S541−s5
26b14aS152 +b24aS252 +2eaS1aS2 +c17
if P¯ 44min4QC1K55>P S ≥ P¯ 54K51
K if P¯ 54K5>P S1
(3)
where
P¯ 0
0= 1a
C
1 +2aC2 +2c1K−c0 −sS
1−−s 1
P¯ 14min4QC1K55
0= 41−−s5−1[1aC1 +2aC2 +2c1K−c0 −sS
−26b14aC1 52 +b24aC2 52 +2eaC1 aC2 +c17min4QC1K5
]
1
P¯ 44min4QC1K55
0= 41−s5−1[1aS1 +2aS2 +2c1K−c0 −t−−sS
−2QCã64b1 −e5aS1 +4b2 −e5aS27
−26b14aS152 +b24aS252 +2eaS1aS2 +c17min4QM1K5
]
1
P¯ 54K5
0= 41−s5−1[1aS1 +2aS2 +2c1K−c0 −t−−sS
−2QCã64b1 −e5aS1 +4b2 −e5aS27
−26b14aS152 +b24aS252 +2eaS1aS2 +c17K
]
0
In P¯ 4 · 54y5, the argument y refers to the last term in
the definition of the threshold. Here, z∗k1 j is the unique
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solution to 4¡/¡z5åk1 j = 0 for k ∈ 8112139 and j ∈
8C1S9. The intuition behind (3) is straightforward: As
P S decreases, the firm processes more units (starting
from C-input).8 This is because spot sales become less
profitable, and spot procurement becomes cheaper.
The exact form of the optimal solution is determined
by comparing the marginal revenue of processing an
additional unit of C- or S-input with the correspond-
ing spot option cost (sale or procurement), leading to
the various price breakpoints indicated.
4.2. Stage 0: Contract Market
At this stage the firm chooses the volume of C-input
to contract to maximize its expected profit in the
presence of spot price and product market uncertain-
ties. The following proposition characterizes the opti-
mal contracting decision QC∗ with the assumption
that P˜ S follows a normal distribution with 4S1S5.
The normality assumption is useful in delineating
the intuition behind the technical statements. The
characterization for a general P˜ S distribution is struc-
turally the same and is provided in §C of the online
technical appendix.
Proposition 3. The optimal volume of C-input is
never higher than plant size 4QC∗ ≤ K5 and is character-
ized by the following first-order condition:
¡
¡QC
V
=−
[
u+S
(
L
(
l−−S
S
)
−L
(
u−−S
S
))]
+S41−5
+SƐ
[
41−−s5L
(
P¯ 14QC5−S
S
)
−41−s5L
(
P¯ 44QC5−S
S
)∣∣∣∣˜∈ì12]Pr4˜∈ì125
+SƐ
[
41−−s5L
(
P 34QC5−S
S
)
−41−s5L
(
P 64QC5−S
S
)∣∣∣∣˜∈ì34]Pr4˜∈ì345
+SƐ
[
41−−s5L
(
P 14QC5−S
S
)
−41−s5L
(
P 44QC5−S
S
)∣∣∣∣˜∈ì56]Pr4˜∈ì565
8 This result depends on our assumption  < 41 −5/s, which
insures that the cost effect of P S (because of spot procurement for
S-input and opportunity loss of spot resale for C-input) dominates
the revenue effect (because of the signaling effect of P S for product
market prices through the correlation parameter ) for any input
type, so that a higher spot price has a negative impact on the value
of processing. The results for  > 41 −5/s are available from the
authors.
−ã64b1 −e5aS1 −4b2 −e5aS27
·Ɛ64S41−s54L44P¯ 44QC5−S5/S5
−L44P¯ 54min4I4S51K55−S5/S555·4b14aS152 +b24aS252
+2eaS1as2 +c15−1  ˜∈ì127Pr4˜∈ì1251 (4)
where L45 = ∫ −4 − z54z5dz is the standard-normal
loss function,
I4S5
0= 41 −25/2−Q
Cã4b1 +b2 −2e5
4b1 −e5aS1 −4b2 −e5aS2
1
P 34QC5= P¯ 34QC5=P 34QC5
0=(614b2 −e5+24b1 −e57s/4b1 +b2 −2e5+2c1K−c0
−sS−264b1b2 −e25s2/4b1 +b2 −2e5+c17QC
)
·41−−s5−11
P 64QC5= P¯ 64QC5=P 64QC5
0= 4614b2 −e5+24b1 −e57s/4b1 +b2 −2e5+2c1K−c0
−t−−sS−264b1b2 −e25s2/4b1 +b2 −2e5+c17QC5
·41−s5−11
P 14QC5
0= 2s+2c1K−c0 −sS−26b2s
2 +c17min4II1QC1K5
1−−s 1
P 44QC5
0= 2s+2c1K−c0 −t−−sS−26b2s
2 +c17QC
1−s 1
and thresholds P¯ 11 P¯ 4, and P¯ 5 are as given in (3).
We have QC∗ = 0 if 4¡V /¡QC50+ ≤ 0 and QC∗ =K
if 4¡V /¡QC5K− ≥ 0; otherwise, it is the solution to
¡V /¡QC = 0.
The first term in (4) is the expected marginal
contract procurement cost. We note here that with
l→ − and u→ , this term equals S+. This is the
expected unit cost of C-input, including the adjust-
ment  to account for differences between C-input
and S-input. When l = u, this term equals u, and the
resulting contract price is independent of P S , which
represents the case of a fixed forward contract.
To understand the remaining terms in (4), let us
first consider the special case in which the firm can
only sell excess C-input into the spot market, but can-
not procure S-input.
Corollary 1. If the firm does not have access to spot
procurement, i.e., t → , the optimality condition in (4) is
given by
¡V
¡QC
= −
[
u+S
(
L
(
l− −S
S
)
−L
(
u− −S
S
))]
+S41 −5+S41 −−s5
·
6∑
l=1
Ɛ
[
L
(
Pˆ l −S
S
)∣∣∣∣ ˜ ∈ìl]Pr4˜ ∈ìl51 (5)
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where Pˆ 1 = Pˆ 2 = P¯ 14QC5, Pˆ 3 = Pˆ 4 = P 34QC5, and Pˆ 5 =
Pˆ 6 = P 14QC5.
The sum of S41 − 5 and the final term in (5) is
the expected marginal revenue of an additional unit
of C-input (without spot procurement, but allowing
spot sale of the C-input). At Stage 1, the firm has two
options for C-input, spot sale or processing. There-
fore, the indicated expected marginal revenue is the
maximum of these two options. This is represented as
the sum of the expected marginal profit from a spot
sale 4S41 − 55 and the marginal profit over a spot
sale from processing the C-input. In the absence of
spot procurement, the additional unit of C-input is
processed only if the firm optimally processes all the
available C-input at Stage 1, i.e., z∗ = QC . From (3),
it can be shown that the marginal profit of process-
ing at z=QC is 41 −−s54P 4 · 5 − P˜ S5+. The form of
P 4 · 5 depends on the product substitution regime used
with C-input processing and is different across the
ì4 · 5 regions. This explains the SƐ641 −  − s5L4 · 57
terms in (4).
Access to spot procurement has a negative impact
on the marginal revenue of an additional C-input. In
(4), this impact is captured by the expression in the
last line and the second terms 4−S41 −s5Ɛ6L4 · 575 in
the second, third, and fourth lines. Because C-input
is preferred over S-input for processing, the addi-
tional unit of C-input is always processed for z∗ ≥QC .
For spot price realizations inducing z∗ >QC , the firm
replaces the first unit of S-input with the additional
unit of C-input. Therefore, the firm loses the marginal
profit of processing the first unit of S-input. From (3),
it can be shown that the marginal profit of processing
the first unit of S-input is 41−s54P 4 · 5− P˜ S5+. The form
of P 4 · 5 depends on the product substitution regime
used with S-input processing and is different within
ì4 · 5 regions. This explains −SƐ641 − s5L4 · 57 terms
in (4).
The expression in the last line of (4) is the impact
of an additional unit of C-input on all S-inputs. When
the firm operates under the no product substitution
regime for S-input, i.e., for  ∈ì12, the marginal profit
of processing an S-input is given by
¡
¡z
å11 S = −c0 + 2c14K− z5− P S − t− 
+ aS141 +4P S −S55+ aS242 +4P S −S55
− 2ã64b1 − e5aS1 − 4b2 − e5aS27QC
− 26b14aS152 + b24aS252 + 2eaS1aS27z0 (6)
It follows from (6) that an increase in QC decreases the
marginal profit of processing S-input. The additional
C-input is processed before any S-input and alters the
output prices by providing a higher (lower) yield of
premium (standard) product than S-input as ã≥ 0.
This decreases (increases) the marginal production
revenue of the premium (standard) product. Because
64b1 − e5aS1 − 4b2 − e5aS27 ≥ 0, the net impact is that
the marginal revenue of processing S-input decreases.
This effect does not exist if there is no quality differ-
ence, i.e., ã= 0, or if the firm is a price taker, i.e., b1 =
b2 = e = 0. This effect also does not exist under the
other product substitution regimes because the firm
is indifferent between C- and S-input with respect to
production revenues.9 When this effect exists, it is rel-
evant for all S-input processed under the no prod-
uct substitution regime. In fact, if we define z∗1 as
the optimal processing quantity under the no prod-
uct substitution regime, the last expression in (4) is
equivalent to ã64b1 − e5aS1 − 4b2 − e5aS27Ɛ64z∗1 − QC5+7.
Here Ɛ64z∗1 −QC5+7 denotes the optimal expected vol-
ume of S-input processed under the no substitution
regime.
We close this section with the optimality condition
in (4) for the interesting special case where the firm is
a pure price taker in its product markets.
Corollary 2. If the firm is a price taker in the product
markets, i.e., b1 = b2 = e = 0, the optimality condition in
(4) is given by
¡V
¡QC
=−
[
u+S
(
L
(
l−−S
S
)
−L
(
u−−S
S
))]
+S41−5
+SƐ
[
41−−s5L
(
P¯ 14QC5−S
S
)
−41−s5L
(
P¯ 44QC5−S
S
)∣∣∣∣˜∈ì1]Pr4˜∈ì15
+SƐ
[
41−−s5L
(
P 14QC5−S
S
)
−41−s5L
(
P 44QC5−S
S
)∣∣∣∣˜∈ì6]Pr4˜∈ì651
(7)
where ì1 = 8Î2 Î≥ 01 2 ≤ 19 is the region of no substi-
tution for either input, and ì6 = 8Î2 Î≥ 01 2 > 19 is the
region of full substitution for both C- and S-input.
5. Analysis of Window Contracts
This section describes comparative statics results for
the above model focusing on the impact of the spot
price variability S (§5.1) and the correlation param-
eter  (§5.2) on the optimal expected profit and the
9 As follows from Proposition 1, the optimal sales revenue from
product markets depends on fixed proportions a1 and a2 only under
the no product substitution regime, and depends only on the total
usable input s1′z under the other substitution regimes.
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optimal procurement portfolio (the optimal contract
volume and the expected spot procurement at the
optimal solution) of the firm. Our managerial insights
are summarized in §5.3. We continue to assume P S to
follow a normal distribution.
5.1. Impact of Spot Price Variability S
We first analyze the impact of the spot price variabil-
ity S on the optimal expected profit.
Proposition 4. The optimal expected profit of the firm,
V ∗, increases in S if l= u, or l→ −1u→ , or S +
 > 4l+u5/2.
An increase in S impacts both the expected rev-
enue and the expected contract procurement cost of
the firm. On the revenue side, the firm benefits from
spot price variability because it buys cheap when the
spot price is low and resells to the spot when the spot
price is high. On the cost side, a higher spot price
variability increases the expected contract procure-
ment cost only if the window contract caps upside
variability in contract prices less than downside vari-
ability relative to mean contract procurement prices:
S +  < 4l+u5/2.10 Therefore, if the firm uses a fixed
forward contract 4l= u5, or an unconstrained contract
4l→ −, u→ 5, or any contract with higher upside
protection than foregone downside contract procure-
ment savings 4S +  > 4l+u5/25, then the optimal
expected firm profit increases in S .
To analyze the impact of S on the optimal procure-
ment portfolio, we will focus on the pure price-taker
special case of our model as presented in Corollary 2.
In this case, the expected marginal cost of C-input is
given by
u+S
(
L
(
l− −S
S
)
−L
(
u− −S
S
))
1
and the expected marginal revenue of C-input is
given by the value of spot and processing options at
Stage 1. In particular, the marginal revenue at Stage 1
is characterized by the processing option when the
spot price is in a certain window (the processing win-
dow); and outside this window, it is characterized by
the opportunity gain from not using spot procure-
ment when the spot price is lower and spot sale rev-
enue when the spot price is higher.
Implicit differentiation of the optimality condition
in (7) yields the following expression characterizing
10 Recall that the unit price of C-input on the day is
6max4min4u1P S + 51u57 with l ≤ u. Thus, when l −  is closer to
the mean spot price S than u−, the firm cannot benefit from low
P S realizations as much to compensate for the negative impact of
high P S realizations.
the sign of the impact of S on the optimal contract
volume:
−
(

(
l− −S
S
)
−
(
u− −S
S
))
+ Ɛ
[
41 −−s5
(
P¯ 14QC
∗
5−S
S
)
− 41 −s5
(
P¯ 44QC
∗
5−S
S
)∣∣∣∣ ˜ ∈ì1]Pr4˜ ∈ì15
+ Ɛ
[
41 −−s5
(
P 14QC
∗
5−S
S
)
− 41 −s5
(
P 44QC
∗
5−S
S
)∣∣∣∣ ˜ ∈ì6]Pr4˜ ∈ì651
(8)
where 4 · 5 is the pdf of the standard normal distri-
bution. The first term in (8) captures the impact of
S on the expected marginal cost of C-input, whereas
the latter terms capture the same on the expected
marginal revenue. As discussed above, a higher S
increases the expected marginal cost, i.e., the first
term is negative only if the window contract provides
a lower upside protection than downside opportunity
loss 4S +  < 4l+u5/25.
The impact of a higher S on the expected marginal
revenue of C-input is more subtle and depends on
the interplay between the spot price and product
market uncertainties. To demonstrate the intuition,
let us focus on a realization of Î ∈ ì1. In this case,
the processing window at Stage 1 is characterized
by 6P¯ 44QC∗51 P¯ 14QC∗57. On this sample path of Î, the
expected marginal revenue of C-input increases in
S if S > 4P¯ 44QC
∗
5+ P¯ 14QC∗55/2 (and decreases in S
otherwise). This is because when the mean spot price
is sufficiently high, with a higher S , C-input ben-
efits from high P S realizations as the value of spot
resale increases, whereas it is not negatively affected
from low P S realizations as much because of the pro-
cessing window. Although the impact of S on the
expected marginal revenue of C-input can be charac-
terized for each Î realization, the overall impact in
expectation with respect to Î is ambiguous because
the limits P¯ 44QC∗51 P¯ 14QC∗5 of the processing window
depend on the product market prices, and in turn
on Î. A stronger result can be obtained in the special
case of no spot procurement access. In the absence
of spot procurement, we can prove that the expected
marginal revenue of C-input increases in S . This is
because the firm uses the spot market only for resale
of C-input, and it does so only when the spot price is
sufficiently high. A higher S increases the probabil-
ity of a higher spot price to induce spot resale, so that
the expected marginal revenue of C-input increases.
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In summary, when there is no access for spot pro-
curement, the optimal contract volume increases in
spot price variability if the firm uses a fixed for-
ward contract 4l = u5, or an unconstrained contract
4l→ −1u→ 5, or any contract with higher upside
protection than downside opportunity loss 4S +  >
4l+u5/25. This result is proven to hold for the general
model and not only for the special case of the price-
taker firm. When the firm uses a contract with lower
upside protection than downside opportunity loss or
if the firm has access to spot procurement, the impact
of S on the optimal contract volume is ambiguous
and is determined by the interplay between spot price
and product market uncertainties.
The impact of S on the expected spot procurement
at the optimal solution is characterized by its impact
on expected spot procurement for a given QC and
the change in the optimal contract volume QC∗. The
spot procurement at Stage 1 is linearly decreasing in
the spot price when this price is in a certain window,
and outside this window, it is at full plant capacity
K−QC∗ when the spot price is lower, and zero when
the spot price is higher. Similar to the impact of S
on the marginal revenue of C-input, the impact of
S on this window is ambiguous because the limits
of it depend on the product market prices. In all of
our numerical experiments reported in the next sec-
tion, we observe that the expected spot procurement
decreases (increases) when the optimal contract vol-
ume increases (decreases). However, we do not have
a proof that this apparent regularity is true in general.
5.2. Impact of Correlation Parameter 
We first analyze the impact of the correlation param-
eter  on the optimal expected profit.
Proposition 5. The optimal expected profit of the firm,
V ∗, decreases in .
The intuition here is that the firm benefits from
asymmetry between the spot price and the product
market price. With a lower correlation,11 there will be
a higher likelihood when the spot price is low (high)
that the product market price will be high (low).
When the spot price is low, the firm can buy S-input at
a cheaper price and, after processing, can sell the two
outputs at a high price. When the spot price is high,
the firm optimally does not buy from the spot mar-
ket (and indeed, may resell its C-input in the spot),
and the lower product market price is less consequen-
tial. In short, low product market prices and high spot
11 The reader should note that an increase in  increases not just cor-
relation, but also final product price variability, so the noted effect
from  may be due in part to the increased variability in prod-
uct prices. Moreover, as noted in the next section, computational
examples show that increased product market price variability itself
leads to increased profits, but we have no general proof of this.
price become less consequential with a lower correla-
tion because of the increased likelihood of using avail-
able options upstream or downstream (or both).
To analyze the impact of  on the optimal pro-
curement portfolio, we will once more focus on the
pure price-taker special case. The correlation param-
eter  affects only the expected marginal revenue
of C-input and not the expected marginal cost. We
will first note that  has an opposite impact on the
marginal revenue of C-input to that associated with
the impact of S . Recall that the marginal revenue of
C-input at Stage 1 is characterized by the processing
option when the spot price is in a certain window;
outside this window, it is characterized by the oppor-
tunity gain from not using spot procurement when
the spot price is lower and spot sale revenue when
the spot price is higher. On the right tail of this win-
dow, a higher S increases the probability of a spot
resale of C-input as the probability of higher spot
price realizations that induce the spot resale increases.
In contrast, a higher  decreases the probability of
a spot resale, because the processing option becomes
more valuable when the spot price is high due to
the increasing correlation. On the left tail of the pro-
cessing window, a higher S increases the probabil-
ity of spot procurement as the probability of lower
spot price realizations that induce the spot procure-
ment increases. In contrast, a higher  decreases the
probability of spot procurement because the process-
ing option with S-input becomes less valuable when
the spot price is low because of increasing correla-
tion. Therefore,  and S have opposite impacts on
the expected marginal revenue of C-input.
Paralleling the argument above, it can be shown
that the impact of  on the optimal contract volume
is of the opposite sign to the impact of S on the
expected marginal revenue of C-input, i.e., the last
two terms in (8), evaluated at = 0. This result also
holds true for the general model and not only for
the special case of the price-taker firm. Similar to the
impact of spot price variability as discussed in §5.1,
the impact of  on the optimal contract volume is
ambiguous. In the absence of spot procurement, it can
be proven that QC∗ decreases in  in the context of the
general model. In this case, the expected marginal rev-
enue of C-input is the maximum of the two available
options, spot sale or processing. A lower , and thus
a lower correlation, provides a natural hedge between
these two options: the value of one option is higher
when the other is lower. For the impact of  on the
expected spot procurement at the optimal solution,
we can also show for the general model that this effect
is of the opposite sign to the impact of S .
5.3. Discussion
The managerial insights from our analysis are as
follows. The firm benefits from a lower correlation
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between the spot price and product market uncer-
tainties, and this is independent of the form of the
window contract. The firm benefits from a higher
spot price variability if the firm uses a fixed forward
contract, an unconstrained contract, or any window
contract with higher upside protection than down-
side opportunity loss. Otherwise, there exists a trade-
off between a higher contract procurement cost and
higher expected revenues from processing. In the
absence of spot procurement, the firm should increase
its contract volume with a lower correlation. The same
holds with a higher spot price variability if the win-
dow contract does not have a lower upside protection
than the downside opportunity loss. With spot pro-
curement, the impact of the correlation and the spot
price variability on the optimal procurement portfolio
is determined by the interplay between the spot price
and product market uncertainties and is ambiguous
in general.
We close this section with an important remark on
the value of window contract with respect to the fixed
forward contract. Let F¯ denote the price of the for-
ward contract, and let l = F¯ −  , u= F¯ +  denote the
parameters of the window contract that is symmetric
around F¯ , where  < F¯ . The value of using a win-
dow contract instead of a fixed forward contract and
its implications on the optimal procurement portfolio
critically depend on the ordering between the forward
price and the mean contract procurement price, as the
next result shows.
Proposition 6. The optimal contract volume and the
optimal expected profit are lower (higher), whereas the
expected spot procurement at the optimal solution is
higher (lower) with the window contract if F¯ > S +
4F¯ < S + 5.
In the next section, we shed more light on the main
drivers of the optimal procurement portfolio using
numerical experiments and analytical results based on
beef supply chains.
6. Computational Experiments for the
Beef Supply Chain
This section describes computational results for the
above model based on data for the U.S. beef indus-
try described in the GIPSA (2007) report and com-
plemented by industry demand and supply studies.
The GIPSA data pertain to the period October 2002
through March 2005. We focus on an average-sized
U.S. packer (see GIPSA 2007, Tables 3.2, 3.3, Fig-
ure 3.1) with a rated capacity of 25,000 heads of cattle
per week (corresponding to the mean plant size of
the GIPSA (2007) report of 103,733 cattle per month
as reported in Table 3.2). Tables 1 and 2 provide the
benchmark values for this packer and the relevant
range for the sensitivity analysis we will undertake.
Contracting in the U.S. beef market is based on
a “framework agreement” signed six months to a
year, or longer, in advance of spot deliveries between
feedlot owners and packers. Although the quality
and delivery terms are specified in the “framework
agreement,” quantity is not. Contracted quantity (i.e.,
C-input) is determined between a few weeks and
a few months in advance of the spot day, and can
depend on regional supplies and other factors. What
is fixed in advance is the structure of the contract for
C-input. The most common contract used in the U.S.
fed-cattle industry is a window contract benchmarked
on spot price. In terms of the general window con-
tract specified earlier, in which contract price equals
max4min4u1P S +51 l5, the standard industry contract
has no limits (l → − and u → ), and the contract
adjustment parameter  is specified simply as  =ãv,
which represents the value per unit of the quality
difference ã per unit of C-input relative to S-input.
In beef supply chains, this quality difference results
from special feeding regimes undertaken for fed cat-
tle purchased under contract (C-input) relative to the
greater heterogeneity of cattle purchased in the spot
market (S-input).
For computational experiments, we assume Î˜′ =
4˜11 ˜25 to follow a bivariate normal distribution and
P S to follow a normal distribution.12 Because no infor-
mation is available in the GIPSA study on the correla-
tion between the spot price and final product prices,
this correlation was assumed to be zero for these
experiments, i.e.,  = 0 in the price equations.13 We
programmed the first-order condition and the other
performance measures in MATLAB. We validated the
code against a number of tests that included mak-
ing comparisons between the MATLAB results and
(i) explicitly calculated optimal values for the perfor-
mance measures when Î˜ and P˜ S equaled their mean
values (in this case,  and S were assigned very low
values so that all the probability mass was located at
the mean) and (ii) results of several special cases of
the problem for which analytical results exist on the
12 It follows from Tables 1 and 2 that the coefficients of variation are
not large; hence the nonnegativity of the random variables embod-
ied in our normality assumption is unproblematic.
13 The appropriate correlation measure between final product prices
and spot prices is that associated with the contracting decisions
(one to two months in advance of the spot). The authors’ analy-
sis of this shows that for the past decade this correlation has been
relatively low, on the order of 0.1 to 0.3, depending on how far in
advance of the spot day the contract delivery quantity is agreed. If
prices are averaged on a quarterly basis over a longer time period,
this correlation is significantly higher, and can exceed 0.75 for U.S.
beef markets. However, the relevant correlation for the problem
studied here is the much lower correlation corresponding to quan-
tity decisions in the four- to eight-week advance contract market.
In particular, neglecting this correlation in the simulation studies
here is not likely to have a significant effect on results.
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Table 1 Description of the Spot and Contract Market Characteristics in Numerical Studies
Notation Description Benchmark value Range
 Transaction cost in spot sales (percentage) 4% of P S
t Transaction cost in spot procurement 4% of S ($64/head)
S Mean spot price $1,600/head −25% to 10% of the benchmark with 5% increments
S Spot price volatility 8% of S (128) 4% to 9% of S with 1% increments
v Surcharge parameter for quality difference of C-input ($4,800/head)
ãv = 3075% of S
Table 2 Description of the Processing Characteristics in Numerical Studies
Notation Description Benchmark value Range
c1 Utilization cost parameter $0.001
c0 Common processing cost parameter $100/head
 Nonuniformity cost of S-input $1.39/head
K Plant size 25,000 head/week
e Cross-price elasticity parameter 0.005 0 to 0.01 with 0.0025 increments
b1 Own price coefficient for program beef 0.035
b2 Own price coefficient for commodity beef 0.01
1 Mean demand of program beef 3,800 2% to 12% of the benchmark with 2% increments
2 Mean demand of commodity beef 3,000
1 = 2 =  Demand variability 6% of 2 (180) 3% to 8% of 2 with 1% increments
 Demand correlation 0.9 0.75 to 1 with 0.05 increments
aS1 Fixed proportion of program beef with S-input processing 0.18
aS2 Fixed proportion of commodity beef with S-input processing 0.42
ã Quality Difference = aC1 − aS1 = aS2 − aC2 0.0125
s Total proportion of usable carcass = aC1 + aC2 = aS1 + aS2 0.60
behavior of the optimal performance measures. We
note some of these analytical results below.
Our computational experiments focus on the
impact of spot price uncertainty 4S1S5, prod-
uct market uncertainty 4i115, and the cross-
price elasticity parameter 4e5 on the optimal
procurement portfolio (the optimal contract volume
QC
∗, the expected spot procurement at the opti-
mal solution Ɛ6QS∗7, and the optimal portfolio ratio
QC
∗
/4QC
∗ + Ɛ6QS∗75) and the optimal expected profit
V ∗ of the packer.14 Table 3 summarizes the impact
of these parameters over their entire range as speci-
fied in Tables 1 and 2. A detailed discussion of the
model calibration and a more extensive analysis of
the impact of several other parameters of interest on
a broader set of performance measures are available
in Boyabatlı et al. (2011).
Two remarks are helpful before reporting our
numerical results: First, in all of our numerical exper-
iments reported below, we observe that the firm opti-
mally sells at most 307% of the C-input to the spot
market on expectation. Therefore, although the firm
has both the sale and procurement options on the
spot market, for the particular plant and markets
modeled here, only the spot procurement option has
a significant value. Second, in all of our numerical
14 The expected profit includes $900,000 in fixed costs (including
payments to owners/investors) per week.
experiments, in the optimal solution, all of the prob-
ability mass Î is located in the ì1 region. There-
fore, we can focus only on this region in delineating
the intuition behind the numerical observations. This
observation also enables us to prove the sign of some
of the comparative static results analytically. These
results are highlighted in Table 3 with a box around
the relevant cell, indicating that the specific numerical
result shown is actually provable by assuming that
all of the probability mass of Î is located in the ì1
region. The results that can be proven without this
assumption, i.e., the general window contract of §4,
Table 3 Impact of Parameters on the Performance Measures:
↑↓ Implies That Expected Spot Procurement First
Increases Then Decreases with an Increase in S
Contract Expected spot Portfolio Expected
An increase in volume procurement ratio profit
S ↓ ↑↓ ↓ ↓
S ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
i ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
 ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
 ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
e ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓
Boyabatlı, Kleindorfer, and Koontz: Integrating Long- and Short-Term Contracting in Beef Supply Chains
Management Science 57(10), pp. 1771–1787, © 2011 INFORMS 1785
are denoted with a “double box” around the cell. The
proofs for the analytical results are relegated to §E of
the online technical appendix.
We now discuss the intuition behind the results
in Table 3. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 focus on the impact
of spot price and product market uncertainty respec-
tively. We investigate the impact of product and
demand substitution on the key performance mea-
sures in §6.3. Our managerial insights are summa-
rized in §6.4.
6.1. Effect of Spot Price Uncertainty 4S1S5
An increase in the mean spot price S decreases the
optimal expected profit of the packer.15 This is because
both the expected C-input and S-input procurement
cost increase. Because the expected spot procure-
ment cost increases, the marginal revenue of C-input
increases with a higher S . However, a higher S also
increases the marginal procurement cost of C-input,
and this outweighs the increase in the marginal rev-
enue. Therefore, QC∗ decreases. On the impact of a
higher S on the expected spot procurement, two
effects work in the opposite directions: A lower QC∗
works to increase it, whereas a higher expected spot
procurement cost works to decrease it. For sufficiently
low values of S , the former effect dominates, and the
expected spot procurement increases. For sufficiently
large values of S , the packer does not contract any
C-input, and only the latter effect exists. Thus, the
expected spot procurement decreases with an increase
in S . As QC
∗ decreases, the optimal portfolio ratio
decreases with an increase in S .
An increase in the spot price variability S increases
the optimal expected profit as follows from Proposi-
tion 4. The optimal contract volume decreases in S .
The packer uses the spot market almost exclusively
for procurement, and it does so when the spot price is
low. A higher S means a higher probability that the
spot price is sufficiently low to induce spot procure-
ment. The larger reliance on the spot market decreases
the marginal revenue of C-input, and the optimal con-
tract volume decreases. Because QC∗ decreases with
an increase in S , the expected spot procurement at
the optimal solution increases, and the portfolio ratio
decreases.
6.2. Effect of Product Market Uncertainty
4i115
An increase in the mean demand parameter i
increases the optimal expected profit of the packer.
This is because the average product price increases,
increasing also the expected revenues from pro-
cessing. Because the value of processing increases,
15 The same result is proven to hold for the general window contract
for ≥ 0 and ê44u− −S5/s5−ê44l− −S5/s5≥ 1−, where
ê4 · 5 is the cdf of the standard normal distribution.
the marginal revenue of C-input increases, and the
packer increases the optimal contract volume with
a higher i. Because QC
∗ increases with an increase
in i, the expected spot procurement at the optimal
solution decreases, and the portfolio ratio increases.
For the effect of  and  , we note here that Î˜
appears in the form of W˜ = h1˜1 +h2˜2 for hi ∈ 8aCi 1 aSi 9
in a linearly increasing fashion both in the marginal
revenue of C-input and the expected profit of the
packer for a given QC . Because Î˜ is bivariate nor-
mal, W˜ is normally distributed with mean h11 +h22
and standard deviation ¯
0= 
√
h21 +h22 + 2h1h2 .
Therefore, increasing  or  leads to a higher prod-
uct market variability ¯ . Because the firm optimally
processes only when product market return is suffi-
ciently high, a higher ¯ increases the value of the pro-
cessing option of the firm, and the optimal expected
profit of the firm increases. For the impact of 
and  on the optimal contract volume, the packer
uses spot procurement only when the product mar-
ket return is sufficiently high (for a given spot price
realization). A higher ¯ means a higher probability
that the product market return is sufficiently high
to induce spot procurement. The larger reliance on
spot market decreases the marginal revenue of C-
input, and the optimal contract volume decreases.
Because QC∗ decreases with an increase in  or  ,
the expected spot procurement at the optimal solution
increases, and the portfolio ratio decreases.
6.3. Effect of Demand and Product Substitution
The effect of demand substitution (through the cross-
price elasticity parameter e) is driven by the change
in the product market profitability. As e increases,
because the two outputs are substitutes, the firm is
not able to price differentiate between the two mar-
kets because of the higher cross-price effect, and the
profitability of the product market decreases. There-
fore, a higher e decreases the value of processing,
and thus the optimal expected profit of the packer.
With an increase in e, because the value of processing
decreases, the marginal revenue of C-input, and thus
QC
∗, decreases. A lower dependence on contract pur-
chases leads to a higher expected spot procurement
and a lower contract ratio.
The effect of product substitution is driven by
the product substitution regime used by the firm.
From our computational experiments, we observe
that product substitution does not have any value
for the calibration implied by the GIPSA data: The
packer optimally does not use any product substi-
tution. This observation is consistent with empiri-
cal observations, as packers rarely convert premium
product (program beef) to standard product (com-
modity beef) in practice. We note here that the inef-
fectiveness of product substitution depends partly on
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the high value of  . As follows from Proposition 1,
the optimal substitution regime is determined by the
difference between two market prospects 4˜1 − ˜25.
As  decreases, the asymmetry between ˜1 and ˜2
increases, and the packer starts using partial and full
product substitution regimes. We observe numerically
that the expected premium product substitution ratio,
Ɛ6x∗127/4Ɛ6x
∗
11 + x∗1275, increases with a decrease in  for
sufficiently negative correlation levels. In this case,
product substitution does have a significant effect on
the optimal procurement portfolio and the expected
profit of the packer.
6.4. Discussion
The managerial insights from our analysis are as fol-
lows. A lower mean spot price and a higher mean
demand increase the packer’s profitability as well as
increase contract procurement relative to spot pro-
curement. The packer also benefits from a higher spot
price variability, a higher product market variability,
and a higher correlation between product markets.
With an increase in any three of these variability mea-
sures, the packer should decrease contract volumes
and rely more on spot procurement. Higher demand
substitution is detrimental to the packer’s profitabil-
ity and reduces dependence on contract procurement,
but product substitution does not have any significant
effect on the packer’s decisions and performance.
These results on variability, both upstream and
downstream, show the interplay between the options
value of contract markets and the volatility of prices.
One of the most important elements of the beef con-
text is the fact that contract prices and spot prices
are closely linked through the standard contract. Even
with this close link, the sensitivity of the optimal port-
folio to variability in both upstream and downstream
markets is evident from Table 3. What this indicates
is a strong interaction among upstream and down-
stream factors. These factors vary considerably over
time depending on supply and demand of the respec-
tive cattle entering into these two markets (e.g., see
Figure 2.1 and the ensuing discussion in the GIPSA
2007 report). As a result, what one can expect is that
the optimal portfolio, and the value of the contract
market itself, will change over time as determinants
of supply/demand and prices change. Indeed, an
important contribution of the framework developed
here is providing improved understanding of how the
optimal supply portfolio should change in response
to varying environmental conditions in a context in
which plant size and technology are fixed, and high
plant utilization is fundamental to profitability.
7. Conclusions
The model and results here provide insights on
optimal procurement decisions for a fixed propor-
tions, multiple-product technology with uncertainties
in both input prices and output prices/demands. The
central question analyzed was the structure of optimal
sourcing portfolios between spot sourcing and long-
term contracts, with the latter taken to be of a general
window form, linear in the spot price but capped by
upper and lower limits on realized contract price. Our
analysis provides managerial insights, as summarized
in §5.3, on the interaction of window contract terms
with processing options. Specializing our generalized
contract form to the standard contract in use in the
beef industry, we illustrate the significant impact on
profits of integrated risk management in this fixed
proportions supply chain. In particular, using a cali-
bration based on the GIPSA (2007) report, this paper
elucidates for the first time the value of long-term
contracting in the beef supply chain. Our compara-
tive statics results provide some rules of thumb for
the packer for the strategic management of the pro-
curement portfolio, as summarized in §6.4.
The results of this paper underline the signif-
icant benefits of coupling input risk management
(through sourcing decisions) and output risk man-
agement (through pricing, production, and product
substitution decisions). This theme of integrated risk
management of supply is becoming increasingly cen-
tral as commoditization of intermediate product mar-
kets continues, driven by global markets and the need
for standardization, and as business-to-business mar-
kets continue to develop in providing the requisite
contracting and hedging instruments for integrated
risk management.
Relaxing the assumptions made here on the pro-
duction environment gives rise to a number of inter-
esting areas for future research, both in the theory
of multiproduct production and in specific applica-
tion areas such as cocoa, oil, and soybeans where a
single input gives rise to multiple outputs in fixed
proportions. First, there are our simplifying assump-
tions of a single-period, single-contract world with
only two final products. The fixed proportions tech-
nology problem in the presence of multiple suppli-
ers is examined by Boyabatlı (2011). The single period
clearly needs to be generalized to a dynamic setting,
following the examples of Kouvelis et al. (2010) and
Secomandi (2010), who provide some results for the
case of a single input and single output. Second, we
have allowed free downward substitution in produc-
tion, which is reasonable in the case of beef process-
ing, but might well entail penalty and options costs
in other contexts, as analyzed by Dong et al. (2010b).
Third, whereas our model encompasses fairly general
contract forms, including fixed forwards and general
window contracts common in many markets, in other
contexts, the price of contract purchases could well
include alternative options features and could be sub-
ject to other determining factors (e.g., the competitive
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model developed by Wu and Kleindorfer 2005). More-
over, even for other live animal supply chains, such
as pork hog and broiler chicken, there are important
differences from the beef market (e.g., for the pork-
hog market, one would see a1 > a2 in contrast to the
beef supply chain, and the optimal operating regime
would therefore occur in different regions of the Î˜
space, with important consequences for substitution
results). These comments and noted limitations sug-
gest a number of open research questions.
Concerning risk management, our focus has been
on physical procurement only. Extensions to over-
lay the cash flows from this physical problem with
financial hedging are an important area of future
research. In the beef industry, for example, there are
significant variations over time in market conditions
and operating profits of packers. To the extent that
profit smoothing would avoid financial transaction
costs under such variable market conditions, financial
hedging can be of significant value. Financial deriva-
tives defined on either input or output markets can
serve this purpose. The existence of such hedging
opportunities can also affect operational decisions, as
the work of Chod et al. (2010b) and Secomandi (2010)
shows.
In addition to short-term issues, there are also
important capacity investment and technology choice
issues in the longer term. Intuitively, it is clear that
the trade-offs involved between scale economies and
operational flexibility (in downward substitution and
yields) are likely to be richer and more complex in a
fixed proportions technology world as analyzed in the
present paper than in the single-input, single-output
world that has been the focus of the supply risk man-
agement literature to date.
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